DISPUTATION
10-ON THE RIGHTEOUSNESS AND EFFICACY OF THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD CONCERNING EVIL
Respondent: Gerard Adrians
I. The consideration of evil, which is called "the evil of
culpability" or "of delinquency," has induced many persons to
deny the providence of God concerning creatures endowed with understanding and
freedom of will, and concerning their actions. These persons have denied it for
two reasons: (1.) They have thought that, because God is good and just,
omniscient and omnipotent, he would have entirely prevented sin from being
committed, if in reality he cared by his providence for his rational creatures
and there actions. (Mark x, 18; Psalm cxlvii, 5; Rev. iv, 8; Mal. ii, 17; iii,
14.) (2.) Because they can conceive in their minds no other administration of
Divine Providence concerning evil, than such as would involve God himself in
the culpability, and would exempt from all criminality the creature, as if he
had been impelled to sin by an irresistible act of God’s efficiency. For this
reason, then, since a belief in the Providence of God is absolutely necessary,
(Luke xii, 28,) from whom a considerable part of his government is taken away
if it be denied that he exercises any care over rational creatures and their
actions; we will endeavour briefly to explain the Efficiency of Divine
Providence concerning evil; and at the same time to demonstrate from this
efficiency, that God cannot possibly be aspersed with the charge of injustice,
and that no stain of sin can attach to him, on the contrary, that this
efficiency is highly conducive to the commendation of God’s righteousness.
II. But in sin are to be considered not only the act, (under which
we likewise comprise the omission of the act,) but also "the transgression
of the law." The act has regard to a natural good, and is called the
material cause of sin; the transgression is a moral evil, and is called the
formal cause of sin. An investigation into both of them is necessary, when we
treat upon the efficiency of God concerning sin: for it is occupied about the
act as it is an act, and as it is done against the law which prohibits its
commission; about the omission of the act as such, and as it is against the law
which commands its performance. But this efficiency is to be considered: (1.)
With regard to the beginning of sin, and its first conception in the heart of a
rational creature; (2.) its attempt, and, through this attempt, its
perpetration; and, (3.) with regard to sin when finished. The efficiency of God
concerning the beginning of sin is either its hindrance or permission; and,
added to permission, the administration both of arguments and occasions
inciting to sin; as well as an immediate concurrence to produce the act. The
Divine efficiency concerning the progress of sin comprises its direction and
determination; and concerning the completion of sin, it is occupied in
punishing or pardoning.
III. The First efficiency of God concerning sin, is Hindrance or
the placing of a hindrance, which, both with regard of the efficiency and of
the object, is three-fold. With respect to efficiency: For (i.) the impediment
is either of sufficient efficacy, but such as does not hinder sin in the act.
(Matt. xi, 21, 23; John xviii, 6.) (ii.) Or it is of such great efficacy as to
render it impossible to be resisted. (iii.) Or it is of an efficacy
administered in such a way by the wisdom of God, as in reality to hinder sin
with regard to the event, and with certainty according to the foreknowledge of
God, although not necessarily and inevitably. (Gen. xx, 6.) With respect to the
object, it is likewise three-fold: for a hindrance is placed either on the power,
the capability, or the will of a rational creature. (i.) The impediment placed
on the power, is that by which some act is taken away from the power of a
rational creature, for the performance of which it has an inclination and
sufficient powers. This is done by legislation, through which it comes to pass
that the creature cannot perform that act without sin. (Gen. ii, 16, 17.) (ii.)
The impediment placed on the capability, is that by which this effect is
produced, that the creature cannot commit the deed, for the performance of
which it possesses an inclination, and powers which, without this hindrance,
would be sufficient. But this hindrance is placed on the capability in four
ways: First. By depriving the creature of the essence and life, which are the foundation
of capability. (1 Kings 19; 2 Kings 1.) Secondly. By the ablation or diminution
of capability. (1 Kings xiii, 4; Rom. vi, 6.) Thirdly. By the opposition of a
greater capability, or at least of one that is equal. (2 Chron. xxvi, 18-21;
Gal. v, 17.) Fourthly. By the withdrawing of the object towards which the act
tends. (John viii, 59.) (iii.) An impediment is placed on the will when, by
some argument, it is persuaded not to will the perpetration of a sin, whether
this argument be taken from the impossibility or the difficulty of the thing;
(Matt. xxi, 46; Hosea ii, 6, 7;) from its unpleasantness or inconvenience, its
uselessness or injuriousness; (Gen. xxxvii, 26, 27;) and, lastly, from its
injustice, dishonour, and indecency. (Gen. xxxix, 8, 9.)
IV. The Permission of sin is contrary to the hindering of it. Yet
it is not opposed to hindrance as the latter is an act which is taken away from
the power of a creature by legislation; for, in this case, the same act would
be a sin, and not a sin — a sin as it was an act forbidden to the power of the
creature, and not a sin as being permitted, that is not forbidden. But
permission is opposed to this hindrance, by which an impediment is placed on
the power and the will of the creature. This permission is a suspension of all
impediments, that, God knows, if they were employed, would in fact, hinder the
sin; and it is a necessary result, because sin might be hindered by a single
impediment of this description. (1.) Sin, therefore, is permitted to the power of
the creature, when God employs none of those impediments which have been
mentioned in the third thesis of this disputation: on which account, this
permission has the following, either as conjoint or preceding acts of God. The
continuance of essence and life to the creature, the preservation of his power,
a care that it be not opposed by a greater power, or at least by one equal to
it, and, lastly, the exhibition of the object on which sin is committed. (Exod.
ix, 16; John xviii, 6; 1 Sam. xx, 31, 32; Matt. xxvi, 2, 53.) (2.) Sin is
permitted also to the will, not by the suspension of every impediment suitable
to deter the will from sinning, but by not employing those which in reality
would hinder, of which kind God must have an immense number in the treasures of
his wisdom and power.
V. The foundation of this permission is, (1.) The liberty of
choice, which God, the Creator, has implanted in his rational creature, and the
use of which the constancy of the Donor does not suffer to be taken away from
this creature. (2.) The infinite wisdom and power of God, by which He knows and
is able to produce good out of evil. (Gen. i, 2, 3; 2 Cor. iv, 6.) And
therefore, God permits that which he does permit, not in ignorance of the
powers and the inclination of rational creatures, for he knows all things; (1
Sam. xxiii, 11, 12;) - -not with reluctance, for it was in his power, not to
have produced a creature who possessed freedom of will, and to have destroyed
him after he was produced; (Rev. iv, 11;) — not as being incapable of
hindering, for how can this be attributed to Him who is both omniscient and
omnipotent? (Jer. xviii, 6; Psalm xciv, 9, 10;) not as an unconcerned
spectator, or negligent of that which is transacted, because even before any
thing is done, he has already gone through the various actions concerning it,
and has, besides, an attentive eye upon it to direct and determine to punish or
to pardon it. (Psalm lxxxi, 12, 13.) But whatever God permits, he permits it
designedly and voluntarily, His will being immediately concerned about its
permission, which permission itself is immediately occupied about sin, which
order cannot be inverted without injury to divine justice and truth. (Psalm v, 4,
5.)
VI. We must now, with more distinctness, explain, by some of the
differences of sin, those things which we have spoken thus generally about
hindering and permitting. (1.) The distinction of sin, from its causes, into
those of ignorance, infirmity, malignity, and negligence, will serve our
purpose. For an impediment is placed on a sin of ignorance, by the revelation
of the divine will; (Psalm cxix, 105;) on a sin of infirmity, by the
strengthening of the Holy Spirit; (Ephes. iii, 16;) on a sin of malignity, by
"taking away the stony heart, and by bestowing a heart of flesh,"
(Ezek. xi, 19,) and inscribing on it the law of God; (Jer. xxxi, 33;) and on a
sin of negligence, by a holy solicitude excited in the hearts of believers.
(Jer. xxxii, 40.) From these, it will be easily evident, in the suspension of
which of these acts consists the permission of sins under each of the preceding
classes. (2.) The distinction of sin according to the relation of the law which
commands the performance of good, and of that which prohibits the commission of
evil, has also a place in this explanation. For, against the prohibitory part,
an offense is committed, either by performing an act, or from an undue cause
and end, omitting its performance — against the perceptive part, either by
omitting an act, or by performing it in an undue manner, and from an undue
cause and end. To these distinctions also, God’s hindering and permitting may
be adapted. For Joseph’s brethren were hindered from killing him; but they were
induced to omit that act from an undue cause and end. (Gen. xxxvii, 26, 27.)
Absalom was hindered from following the counsel of Ahithophel, which was useful
to himself, and hurtful to David; but he did not abstain from it through a just
cause, and from a good end. (2 Sam. 17.) God hindered Balaam from cursing the
children of Israel, and caused him to bless them; but it was in such a manner
that he abstained from the former act, and performed the latter with an
insincere and knavish mind. (Num. 23.)
VII. We shall more correctly understand the reasons and causes
both of hindering and permitting, if, while distinctly considering in sin the
act, and the transgression of the law, we apply to each of them the divine
hindrance and permission. But though, in sin, the act and the transgression of
the law are inseparably connected, and therefore neither can be hindered or
permitted without the other; yet they may be distinguished in the mind, and God
may hinder and permit sometimes with regard to the act or to the transgression
alone; at other times, principally with regard to the one of them or to both,
and these his acts may become objects of consideration to us. God hindered
Elijah from being forcibly brought to Ahaziah to be killed, not as that was a
sin, but as it was an act. This is apparent from the end and the mode of
hindering. From the end, because it was His will that the life of His prophet
should be spared, not lest Ahaziah should sin against God. From the mode of
hindering, because he destroyed two companies, of fifty men each, who had been
sent to seize him, which was a token of divine anger against Ahaziah and the
men, by which sin is not usually hindered as such, but as it is an act which
will prove injurious to another: but through Grace, sin is hindered as such. (2
Kings 1.) God permitted Joseph to be sold, when he hindered his murder. He
permitted his vendition, not more as it was a sin than as it was an act; for by
the sale of Joseph, as it was an act, God obtained his end. (Gen. xxxvii, 1,
20; Psalm cv, 17.) But God hindered David from laying violent hands on Saul,
not so much as it was an act, as in reference to its being a sin. This appears
from the argument by which David was induced to refrain. "The Lord
forbid," said he, "that I should stretch forth mine hand against the
Lord’s anointed." (1 Sam. xxiv, 7.) God permitted Ahab to kill Naboth,
rather as it was a sin than as it was an act; for thus Ahab filled up the
measure of his iniquities, and accelerated the infliction of punishment on
himself; for, by some other way than this, God could have taken Naboth to
himself. (1 Kings 21.) But Abimelech was hindered from violating the chastity
of Sarah — both as it was an act by which indelible grief would have been
brought down upon Abraham, whom He greatly loved, and as it was a sin; for God
was unwilling that Abimelech should defile himself with this crime, because
"in the integrity of his heart," he would have done it. (Gen. xx, 6.)
On the contrary, God permitted Judah to know Tamar, his daughter-in-law — both
as an act because God willed to have Christ born in direct descent from Judah,
and as it was a sin, for it was the will of God thus to declare: Nothing is so
polluted that it cannot be sanctified in Christ Jesus. (Gen. xxxviii, 18.) For
it is not in vain that Matthew has informed us, that Christ was the Son of
Judah by Tamar, as he was also the Son of David by the wife of Uriah. (Matt.
1.) This matter when diligently considered by us, conduces both to illustrate
the wisdom of God, and to promote our own profit, if in our consciences, we
solicitously observe from what acts and in what respect we are hindered, and
what acts are permitted to us.
VIII. Beside this permission, there is another efficiency of the
providence of God concerning the Beginning of Sin, that is, the Administration
or management of arguments and occasions, which incite to an act that cannot be
committed by the creature without sin, if not through the intention of God, at
least according to the inclination of the creature, and not seldom according to
the events which thence arise. (2 Sam. xii, 11, 12; xvi, 21-23.) But these
arguments are presented either to the mind, (2 Sam. xxiv, 1; 1 Chron. xxi, 1;
Psalm cv, 25,) or to the senses, both external and internal; (Job 1 & 2;
Isa. x, 5-7;) and this indeed, either by means of the service or intervention
of creatures, or by the immediate act of God himself. The end of God in this
administration is — to try whether it be the will of the creature to abstain
from sinning, even when it is excited by these incentives; (for small praise is
due to the act of abstaining, in those cases in which such excitements are
absent,) and, if it be the will of the creature to yield to these alluring
attractions, to effect his own work by the act of the creature; not impelled by
necessity, as if He was unable to complete his own work without the aid of the
creature; but through a desire to demonstrate his manifold wisdom. Consider the
Arguments by which the brethren of Joseph, through their own malice, were
incited to will his murder: these were — Joseph’s accusation, by which he
disclosed to his father the deeds of his brethren, the peculiar affection which
Jacob cherished for Joseph, the sending of a dream, and the relation of it.
Consider also the Occasions or opportunities, the mission of Joseph to his
brethren at his father’s request, and the opportune appearance of the
Ishmaelites who were traveling into Egypt, (Gen. 37.)
IX. The last efficiency of God concerning the Beginnings of sin,
is the divine concurrence, which is necessary to produce every act; because
nothing whatever can have an entity except from the first and chief Being, who
immediately produces that entity. The concurrence of God is not his in, mediate
influx into a second or inferior cause, but it is an action of God immediately
flowing into the effect of the creature, so that the same effect in one and the
same entire action may be produced simultaneously by God and the creature.
Though this concurrence is placed in the mere pleasure or will of God, and in
his free dispensation, yet he never denies it to a rational and free creature,
when he has permitted an act to his power and will. For these two phrases are
contradictory, "to grant permission to the power and the will of a
creature to commit an act," and "to deny the divine concurrence
without which the act cannot be done." But this concurrence is to the act
as such, not as it is a sin: And therefore God is at once the effector and the
permittor of the same act, and the permittor before he is the effector. For if
it had not been the will of the creature to perform such an act, the influx of
God would not have been upon that act by concurrence. And because the creature
cannot perform that act without sin, God ought not, on that account, to deny
the divine concurrence to the creature who is inclined to its performance. For
it is right and proper that the obedience of the creature should be tried, and
that he should abstain from an unlawful act and from the desire of obeying his
own inclinations, not through a deficiency of the requisite divine concurrence;
because, in this respect, he abstains from an act as it is a natural good, but
it is the will of God that he should refrain from it as it is a moral evil.
X. The preceding considerations relate to the Beginnings of sin.
In reference to the Progress of sin, a two-fold efficiency of divine providence
occurs, direction and determination. The direction of sin is an act of divine
providence, by which God wisely, justly, and powerfully directs sin wherever he
wills, "reaching from one end to another mightily, and sweetly ordering
all things." (Wisdom viii, 1.) In the divine direction is likewise
contained a leading away from that point whither it is not the will of God to
direct it. This direction is two-fold, unto an object, and unto an end.
Direction unto an object is when God allows the sin, which he permits, to be
borne, not at the option of the creature, towards an object which, in any way
whatsoever, is exposed and liable to the injury of sin; but which he directs to
a particular object that sometimes has been no part of the sinner’s aim or
intention, or that he has at least not absolutely intended. (Prov. xvi, 9; xxi,
1.) Of this we have a signal example in Nebuchadnezzar, who, when he had
prepared himself to subjugate nations, preferred to march against the Jews
rather than the Ammonites, through the divine administration of his
divinations. (Ezek. xxi, 19-22.) Direction unto an end is, when God does not
allow the sin, which he permits, to be conducive to any end which the creature
intends; but he uses it for that end which he himself wills, whether the
creature intend the same end, (by which he would not still be excused from
sin,) or whether he has another purpose which is directly contrary. The vendition
of Joseph into Egypt, the temptation of Job, and the expedition of the king of
Assyria against the Jews, afford illustrations of these remarks. (Gen. i, 20,
21; Job 1 & 2; Isa. x, 5-12.)
XI. The determination of sin is an act of divine providence by which
God places a measure or check on his permission, and a boundary on sin, that it
may not, at the option and will of the creature, wander in infinitum. This mode
and boundary are placed by the circumscription of the time, and the
determination of the magnitude. The circumscription of the time is, when the
space of time, in which the permitted sin could continue, is diminished and
circumscribed so as to stop itself. (Matt. xxiv, 22.) In this part also, regard
must be had to the act as such, and to the sin as such. (i.) God places a
boundary to the duration of the act, when he takes the rod of iniquity from the
righteous, lest they commit any act unworthy of themselves; (Psalm cxxv, 3;)
and when "he delivers the godly out of temptation." (2 Pet. ii, 9.)
(ii.) God places a boundary to the duration of the sin when he "hedges up
the way of the Israelites with thorns," that they may no longer commit
idolatry; (Hosea ii, 6, 7;) when "He commands all men every where to
repent," among "all nations, whom he suffered, in times past, to walk
in their own ways." (Acts xiv, 16; xvii, 30.) A boundary is fixed to the magnitude of sin,
when God does not permit sin to increase to excess and assume greater strength.
This also is done with respect to it as an act, or as a sin. (i.) In the former
respect, as an act, God hindered "the wrath of their enemies from
swallowing up" the children of Israel, though he had permitted it to rise
up against them; (Psalm cxxiv, 2, 3;) He permitted "no temptation to seize
upon" the Corinthians "but such as is common to man"; (1 Cor. x,
13;) He hindered the devil from putting forth his hand against the life of Job;
(1 & 2;) He prevented Shishadk, the king of Egypt, from
"destroying" the Jews, and permitted him only to subject them to
servitude. (2 Chron. xii, 7-9.) (ii.) In respect to it as a sin, God hindered
David from contaminating himself with the blood of Nabal and his domestics.
which he had sworn to shed, and with whom he was then in a state of contention.
(1 Sam. xxv, 22, 26.) He also prevented David from going forth to battle in
company with the army of Achish, (xxvii, 2; xxix, 6, 7,) to whom he had fled,
and "before whom he had reigned himself mad," (xxi, 13,) thus, at the
same time he hindered him from destroying his own countrymen, the Israelites,
and from bringing disasters on the army of Achish. For he could have done
neither of these things without the most flagrant wickedness; though the sin,
also, as an act, seems thus to have been hindered.
XII. On account of this divine permission, the offering of
arguments and opportunities in addition to permission, also on account of this
direction, determination, and divine concurrence, God is said himself to do
those evils which are perpetrated by men and by Satan: To have sent Joseph down
into Egypt, (Gen. xlv, 8,) — to have taken the property of Job, (1 & 2,) —
to have done openly "and before the sun" what David had perpetrated
"secretly" against Uriah. (2 Sam. xii, 11, 12; 16.) This mode of
speech is adopted for the following reasons: (i.) Because the principal parts,
in the actions which are employed to produce such effects, belong to God
himself. (ii.) Because the effects and issues, which result from all these,
even from actions performed by the creature, are not so much in accordance with
the intention of the creatures themselves, as with the purpose of God. (Isa. x,
5-7.) (iii.) Because the wisdom of God knows, if an administration of this kind
be employed by him, that will certainly arise, or ensue, which cannot be
perpetuated by the creature without wickedness; and because His will decrees to
employ this administration. (1 Sam. xxiii, 11-13.) (iv.) A fourth reason may be
added — Because God, who is the universal cause, moves into the effect with a
stronger influence than the creature does, whose entire efficacy depends upon
God.
XIII. Lastly, follows the efficiency of
divine providence concerning sin already perpetrated; which consists in its
punishment and remission. This efficiency is occupied about sin as it is such:
For sin is punished and pardoned as it is an evil, and because it is an evil.
(1.) The Punishment of sin is an act of the providence of God, by which sin is
repaid with the punishment that is due to it according to the justice of God.
This punishment either belongs to the present life, or to that which is to
come. (i.) The latter is the eternal separation of the whole man from God, and
his anguish and torture in the lake of fire. (Matt. xxv, 41; Rev. xx, 15.)
(ii.) The punishment inflicted in this life, is either corporal or spiritual.
Those chastisements which relate to the body, and to the state of the animal
life, are various; but the enumeration of them is not necessary for our
purpose. But spiritual punishment must be diligently considered; which is such
a punishment of a previous sin, as to be also the cause of other subsequent
sins, through the malice of him on whom it is inflicted. It is a privation of
grace, and a delivering up to the power of evil. But Privation is either that
of habitual grace, or that of assisting grace. The former is through the
blinding of the mind, and the hardening of the heart. (Isa. vi, 9, 10.) The
latter is the withdrawing of the assistance of the Holy Spirit, who is wont,
inwardly "to help our infirmities," (Rom. viii, 26,) and outwardly to
repress the temptations of Satan and the world both on the right hand and on
the left; in this holy service, he also engages the ministry and the care of
good angels. (Heb. i, 14; Psalm xci, 11.) A Delivering Up to the power of evil
is, either "giving sinners over to a reprobate mind" and to the
efficacy of error, (Rom. i, 28; 2 Thess. ii, 9-11,) or to the desires of the
flesh and to the lusts of sin, (Rom. i, 24,) or lastly to the power of Satan,
"the god of this world," (2 Cor. iv, 4,)" who worketh powerfully
in the children of disobedience." (Ephes. ii, 2.) But because from this
punishment arise many other sins, and this not only according to the certain
knowledge of God, by which He knows that if He thus punishes, they will thence
arise, but likewise according to his purpose by which He resolves thus to
punish — hence occur the following expressions: "I will harden the heart
of Pharaoh," &c. (Exod. iv, 21; vii, 4.) "Notwithstanding, the
sons of Eli harkened not unto the voice of their father, because it was the
will of the Lord to slay them." (1 Sam. ii, 25.) "But Amaziah would
not hearken to the answer of Joash, king of Israel; for it came of God, that he
might deliver them into the hand of their enemies, because they sought after
the gods of Edom." (2 Chron. xxv, 20.) This consideration distinguishes
the governance of God concerning sins, so far as it is occupied concerning
either those sinners who are hardened, or those who are not hardened.
XIV. (2.) The Pardon or remission of sin
is an act of the Providence of God, by which the guilt of sin is forgiven, and
the punishment due to sin on account of its guilt is taken away. As this
remission restores, to the favour of God, the man who had previously been an
enemy; so it also causes the Divine administration respecting him to be
afterwards entirely gracious, so far as equity and justice require. That is,
through this pardon, he is free from those spiritual punishments which have
been enumerated in the preceding Thesis; (Psalm ii, 10-12;) and though not
exempt from corporal chastisements, yet he is not visited with them through the
anger of God as the punisher of sin, but only through the desire of God thus to
declare that He hates sin, and besides so to chastise as to deter the sinner
from again falling into it. (2 Sam. xii, 11-13.) For which reason, the
government of Providence with regard to this man is entirely different from
that under which he remained before he obtained remission. (Psalm cxix, 67; 1
Cor. xi, 32; Psalm xxxii, 1, 6.) This consideration is exceedingly useful for
producing in man a solicitous care and a diligent endeavour to obtain grace
from God, which may not only be sufficient to preserve him in future from
sinning but which may likewise be so administered by the gracious Providence of
God, as God knows to be best fitted to keep him in the very act from sin.
XV. This is the efficiency of Divine
Providence concerning sin, which cannot be accused of the least injustice. (1.)
For with respect to the Hindering Of Sin, that which is employed by God is
sufficient in its own nature to hinder, and by which it is the duty of the
creature to be hindered from sin, by which also he might actually be hindered
unless he offered resistance and failed of the proffered grace. But God is not
bound to employ all the methods which are possible to Him for the hindrance of
sin. (Rom. 1 and 2; Isa. v, 4; Matt. xi, 21- 23.) (2.) But the cause of sin
cannot be ascribed to the Divine Permission. Not the efficient cause; for it is
a suspension of the Divine efficiency. Not the deficient cause; for it
pre-supposed, that man had a capability not to commit sin, by the aid of Divine
grace, which is either near and ready; or if it be wanting, it is removed to a
distance by the fault of the man himself. (3.) The Presenting of Arguments and
Occasions does not cause sin, unless, per accidens, accidentally. For it is
administered in such a manner, as to allow the creature not only the
spontaneous but also the free use of his own motions and actions. But God is
perfectly at liberty in this manner to try the obedience of his creature. (3.)
Neither can injustice be ascribed with any propriety to The Divine Concurrence.
For there is no reason in existence why God ought to deny his concurrence to
that act which, on account of the precept imposed, cannot be committed by the
creature without sin; (Gen. ii, 16, 17;) which concurrence God would grant to
the same act of the creature, if a law had not been made. (5.) Direction and
Determination have no difficulty. (6.) Punishment and Pardon have in them
manifest equity, even that punishment which contains blinding and hardening;
since God is not wont to inflict it except for the deep demerit and the almost
desperate contumacy of his intelligent creature. (Isa. vi, 7; Rom. 1; 2 Thess.
2, 9-12.)
