DISPUTATION
4-On The Nature Of God
Respondent: James Arminius — when he
stood for his degree of D.D.
I. The very nature of things and the Scriptures of God, as well as
the general consent of all wise men and nations, testify that a nature is
correctly ascribed to God. (Gal. iv, 8; 2 Pet. i, 4; Aristot. De Repub. 1. 7,
c. 1; Cicero De Nat. Deor.)
II. This nature cannot be known a priori: for it is the first of
all things, and was alone, for infinite ages, before all things. It is
adequately known only by God, and God by it; because God is the same as it is.
It is in some slight measure known by us, but in a degree infinitely below what
it is in itself; because we are from it by an external emanation. (Isa.
xliv, 6; Rev. i, 8; 1 Cor. ii, 11; 1 Tim. vi, 16; 1 Cor. xiii, 9.)
III. But this nature is known by us, either immediately through
the unclouded vision of it as it is. This is called "face to face,"
(1 Cor. xiii, 12,) and is peculiar to the blessed in heaven: (1 John iii, 2.)
Or mediately through analogical images and signs, which are not only the
external acts of God and his works through them, (Psalm xix, 1-8; Rom. i, 20,)
but likewise his word, (Rom. x, 14-17,) which, in that part in which it
proposes Christ, "who is the Image of the Invisible God," (Col. i,
15,) as "the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his
person," (Heb. i, 3,) gives such a further increase to our knowledge, that
"we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are
changed into the same image from glory to glory." (2 Cor. iii, 18.) This
is called "through a glass in an enigma," or "darkly," and
applies exclusively to travelers and pilgrims who "are absent from the
Lord." (2 Cor. v, 6; Exod. xxxiii, 20.)
IV. But there are two modes of this second perception from the
works and the word of God. The First is that of Affirmation, (which is also
styled by Thomas Aquinas, "the mode of Causality and by the habitude of
the principle,") according to which the simple perfections which are in
the creatures, as being the productions of God, are attributed analogically to
God according to some similitude. (Psalm xciv, 9, 10; Matt. vii, 11; Isa. xlix,
15.) The Second is that of Negation or Removal, according to which the relative
perfections and all the imperfections which appertain to the creatures, as
having been produced out of nothing, are removed from God. (Isa. iv, 8, 9; 1
Cor. i, 25.) To the mode of Affirmation, (because it is through the habitude of
the cause and principle, to the excellence of which no effect ever rises,) that
of Pre-eminence must be added, according to which the perfections that are
predicated of the creatures are understood to be infinitely more perfect
in God. (Isa. xl, 15, 17, 22, 25.) Though this mode be affirmative and positive
in itself, (for as the nature of God necessarily exists, so it is necessarily
known,) in positively and not in negation; yet it cannot be enunciated or
expressed by us, except through a Negation of those modes according to which
the creatures are partakers of their own perfections, or the perfections in
creatures are circumscribed. Those modes, being added to the perfections of the
creatures, produce this effect, that those which, considered without them, were
simple perfections, are relative perfections, and by that very circumstance are
to be removed from God. Hence it appears, that the mode of Pre-eminence does
not differ in species from the mode of Affirmation and Negation.
V. Besides, in the entire nature of things and in the Scriptures
themselves, only two substances are found, in which is contained every
perfection of things. They are Essence and Life, the former of them
constituting the perfection of all existing creatures; the latter, that of only
some them, and those the most perfect. (Gen. 1; Psalm civ, 29, 148; Acts xvii,
28.) Beyond these two the human mind cannot possibly comprehend any substance,
indeed, it cannot raise its conceptions to any other: for it is itself
circumscribed within the limits of created nature, of which it forms a part; it
is therefore incapable of passing beyond the circle which encloses the whole.
(Rev. i, 8; iv, 8; Dan. vi, 46.) Wherefore in the nature of God himself, only
these two causes of motion, Essence and Life, can become objects of our
consideration.
Let the following be
our problems
Have a corporeal Essence, and a
vegetative and sensitive Life, any analogy to the Essence and Life of God,
though such analogy be less than a spiritual Essence and an intellectual Life?
If they have this analogy, how are body
and senses removed simply from God?
If they have not this analogy, how has
God been able to produce this kind of Essence and Life?
VI. But in God both these are to be considered in the mode of
Pre-eminence, that is, in excellence far surpassing the Essence and Life of all
the creatures. (Psalm cii, 27; 1 Tim. vi, 16.)
The essence of God
VII. The Essence of God is that by which God exists; or it is the
first cause of motion of the Divine Nature by which God is understood to exist.
VIII. Because every Essence, which is either in the superior or in
the inferior nature of things, is distributed into spiritual and corporeal,
(Col. i, 16;) of which, the former notes simply perfection, the latter a
defection or defect from this perfection. On this account we separate corporeal
Essence from God according to the mode of removal, and at the same time all
those things which belong to a corporeal Essence as such, whether it be simple
or compound — such as magnitude, figure, place, or parts, whether sensible or
imaginable. Whence also He cannot be perceived by the corporeal senses, either
by those which are external or by the internal, since he is invisible,
intactable, and incapable of being represented. (Deut. iv, 14; 1 Kings viii, 1
Luke xxiv, 39; John iv, 24; 1 Tim. i, 17.) But we ascribe to Him a spiritual
Essence, and that in the mode of preeminence, as "the Father of
Spirits." (Heb. xii, 9.) Therefore,
(1.) We reject the dogma of the
Anthropo-morphites, those who maintained that "the uncorruptable
God" had a form or body "like to corruptible man," and the
intolerable custom of the Papists, which they constantly practice, in
fashioning a supposed likeness of God’s Essence. (Deut. iv, 15, 16; Rom.
i, 23; Isa. xl, 18; Acts xvii, 29.)
(2.) When bodily members are attributed
in the Scriptures to God, that is done on account of the simplicity of those
effects, which the creatures themselves usually produce only by the aid and
operation of those members.
IX. As we ought to enunciate negatively the mode by which the
Essence of God pre-eminetly both is and is spiritual, above the excellence of
all Essences, even of those which are spiritual; so this may be done first and
immediately in a single phrase, "he is, anarcov kai anaitiov without
beginning and without cause either external or internal." (Isa. xliii, 10;
xliv, 8, xxiv, ; xlvi, 9; Rev. i, 8; Rom. xi, 35, 36; 1 Cor. viii, 4-6; Rom.
ix, 5.) For since there cannot be any advancement in infinitum, (for if there
could, there would be no Essence, no Knowledge,) there must be one Essence,
above and before which no other can exist: but such an Essence must that of God
be; for, to whatsoever this Essence may be attributed, it will by that very act
of ascription be God himself.
X. Because the Essence of God is devoid of all cause, from this
circumstance arise, in the first place, Simplicity and Infinity of Being in the
Essence of God.
XI. Simplicity is a preeminent mode of the Essence of God, by
which he is void of all composition, and of component parts whether they belong
to the senses or to the understanding. He is without composition, because
without external cause; and He is without component parts, because without
internal cause. (Rom. xi, 35, 36; Heb. 2, :10; Isa. xl, 12, 22.) The Essence of
God, therefore, neither consists of material, integral and quantitive parts, of
matter and form, of kind and difference, of subject and accident, nor of form
and the thing formed, (for it is to itself a form, existing by itself and its
own individuality,) neither hypothetically and through nature, through
capability and actuality, nor through essence and being. Hence God is his own
Essence and his own Being, and is the same in that which is, and that by which
it is. He is all eye, ear, hand and foot, because he entirely sees, hears,
works, and is in every place. (Psalm cxxxix, 8- 12.) THEREFORE,
Whatever is absolutely predicated about
God, it is understood essentially and not accidentally; and those things,
(whether many or diverse,) which are predicated concerning God, are, in God,
not many but one: (James i, 17.) It is only in our mode of considering them,
which is a compound mode, that they are distinguished as being many and
diverse; though this may, not inappropriately, be said, because they are
likewise distinguished by a formal reason.
XII. Infinity of Being is a preeminent mode of the Essence of God,
by which it is devoid of all limitation and boundary, (Psalm cxlv, 3; Isa.
xliii, 10,) whether from something above it or below it, from something before
it or after it. It is not bounded by anything above it, because it has received
its being from no one. Nor by anything below it, because the form, which is
itself, is not limited to the capacity of any matter whatsoever that may be its
recipient. Neither by any thing before it, because it is from nothing
efficient: nor after it, because it does not exist for the sake of another end.
But, His Essence is terminated inwardly by its own property, according to which
it is what it is and nothing else. Yet by this no limits are prescribed to its Infinity;
for by the very circumstance, that it is its own being, subsisting through
itself, neither received from another nor in another, it is distinguished, from
all others, and others are removed from it. (Isa. xliv, 9; Rom. xi, 36; Prov.
xvi, 4.) THEREFORE,
Whatsoever is predicated absolutely
about God, is predicated concerning Him immediately, primarily, and without respect
to cause.
XIII. From the Simplicity and Infinity
of the Divine sense, arise Infinity with regard to time, which is called
"Eternity"; and with regard to place, which is called
"Immensity"; Impassability, Immutability, and Incorruptibility.
XIV. Eternity is a pre-eminent mode of
the Essence of God, by which it is devoid of time with regard to the term or
limits of beginning and end, because it is of infinite being; it is also devoid
of time with regard to the succession of former and latter, of past and future,
because it is of simple being, which is never in capability, but always in act,
(Gen. xxi, 33; Psalm xc, 9; Isa. xliv, 6; 2 Tim. i, 9.) According to this mode,
therefore, the Being of God is always the universal, the whole, the plentitude
of his essence, closely, fixedly, and at every instant present with it,
resembling a moment which is also devoid of intelligible parts, and never flows
onward progressively, but always continues within itself. It will be lawful,
therefore, for us, with Boetius, to define Eternity in the following manner,
after changing, by his good leave, the word Life into that of Essence: "It
is an interminable, entire and at the same time, a perfect possession of
Essence. But it seems that I may by some sort of right require this change to
be made, because Essence comes to be considered in the first moving cause of
the Divine Nature, before Life; and because Eternity does not belong to Essence
through Life, but to Life through Essence. THEREFORE,
Whatsoever things are predicated
absolutely concerning God, they belong to Him from all eternity and all
together. It is certain that those things which do not from all eternity belong
to Him, are predicated about Him not absolutely, but in reference to the
creatures, such as, "He is the Creator, the Lord, the Judge of all
men."
XV. Immensity is a pre-eminent mode of
the Essence of God, by which it is void of place according to space and limits:
being co-extended space, because it belongs to simple entity, not having part
and part, therefore not having part beyond part. Being also its own encircling
limits, or beyond which it has no existence, because it is of infinite entity:
and, before all things, God alone was both the world, and place, and all things
to himself; but He was alone, because there was nothing outwardly beyond,
except himself. (l Kings viii, 27; Job xi, 8, 9.)
XVI. After creatures, and places in
which creatures are contained, have been granted to have an existence, from
this Immensity follows the Omnipresence or Ubiquity of the Essence of God,
according to which it is entirely wheresoever any creature or any place is, and
this in exact similarity to a mathematical point, which is totally
present to the entire circumference, and to each of its parts, and yet without
circumscription. If there be any difference, it arises, from the Will, the
Ability and the Act of God. (Psalm cxxxix, 8- 12; Isa. lxvi, 1; Jer. xxiii, 24;
Acts xvii, 27, 28.)
XVII. Impassability is a pre-eminent
mode of the Essence of God, according to which it is devoid of all suffering or
feeling; not only because nothing can act against this Essence, for it is of
infinite Being and devoid of an external cause; but likewise because it cannot
receive the act of anything, for it is of simple Entity. THEREFORE, Christ has
not suffered according to the Essence of his Deity.
XVIII. Immutability is a pre-eminent
mode of the Essence of God, by which it is void of all change; of being
transferred from place to place, because it is itself its own end and good, and
because it is immense; of generation and corruption; of alteration; of increase
and decrease; for the same reason as that by which it is incapable of
suffering. (Psalm cii, 27; Mal. iii, 6; James i, 17.) Whence likewise, in the
Scriptures, Incorruptibility is attributed to God. Nay, even motion cannot
happen to Him through operation; for it appertains to God, and to Him alone, to
be at rest in operation. (Rom. i, 23; Isa. xl, 28.)
XIX. These modes of the Essence of God
belong so peculiarly to Him, as to render them incapable of being communicated
to any other thing; and of whatever kind these modes may be, they are,
according to themselves, as proper to God as His Essence itself, without which
they cannot be communicated, unless we wish to destroy it after despoiling it
of its peculiar modes of being; and according to analogy, they are more
peculiar to Him than his Essence, because they are pre- eminent, for nothing
can be analogous to them. THEREFORE, Christ, according to his humanity, is not
in every place.
XX. Since Unity and Good are the general
affections of Being, the same are also to be attributed to God, but with the
mode of pre-eminence, according to the measure of the Simplicity and Infinity
of his Essence. (Gen. i, 31; Matt. xix, 17.)
XXI. The Unity of the Essence of God is
that according to which it is in every possible way so at one in itself, as to
be altogether indivisible with regard to number, species, genus, parts, modes,
&c. (Deut. iv, 35; 1 Cor. viii)
XXII.
It appertains also to the Essence of God, to be divided from every other
thing: and to be incapable of entering into the composition of any other thing:
while some persons ascribe this property to the Simplicity and others to the
Unity of God’s Essence, several attribute it to both. But on reading the
Scriptures, we find that Holiness is frequently ascribed to God, which usually
designates a separation or setting apart; on this account, perhaps, that very
thing by which God is thus divided from others, may, without any impropriety,
be called by the name of Holiness. (Josh. xxiv, 19; Isa. vi, 3; Gen. ii, 3;
Exod. xiii, 2; 1 Pet. ii, 2-9; 1 Thess. v, 23.) THEREFORE,
God is neither the soul of the world,
nor the form of the universe; He is neither an inherent form, nor a bodily one.
XXIII. The Goodness of the Essence of
God is that according to which it is, essentially in itself, the Supreme and
very Good; from a participation in which all other things have an existence and
are good; and to which all other things are to be referred as to their supreme
end: for this reason it is called communicable. (Matt. xix, 17; Jas. i, 17; 1
Cor. x, 31.)
XXIV. These modes and affections are so
primarily attributed to the Essence of God, that they ought to be deduced
through all the rest of those things which come under our consideration in the
latter momentum of the Divine Nature. If this deduction be made, especially
through those things which appertain to the operation of God, then the most
abundant utility will redound to us from them and from our knowledge of them. This
benefit, however, they will not perform for us, if they be made subjects of
consideration only in this momentum in the Divine Nature. (Mal. iii, 6; Num.
xxiii, 19; Lament. iii, 22; Hosea xi, 9.)
On the life of God
XXV. The Life of God, which comes to be
considered under the second momentum cause of motion in the Divine
Nature, is an act flowing from the Essence of God, by which his Essence is
signified to be in action within itself. (Psalm xlii, 2; Heb. iii, 12; Num.
xiv, 21.)
XXVI. We call it "an act flowing
from his essence"; because, as our understanding forms a conception of
essence and life in the nature of God under distinct forms, and of the essence
as having precedence of the life; we must beware lest the life be conceived as
an act approaching to the essence similar to unity, which, when added to unity,
makes it binary or two-fold. But it must be conceived as an act flowing from
the essence, which advances itself to its own perfection, in the same manner as
a mathematical point by its flowing moves itself forward in length, §
14. It is our wish, that these things be understood only by the confined
capacity of our consideration, who are compelled to use the words of our
darkness, in order in any degree to adumbrate or represent that light to which
no mortal can approach.
XXVII. We say "that the Divine
Essence is in action by means of the life"; because the acts of God, the
internal as well as the external, those which are directed inwards and those
directed outwards, must all be ascribed to His life as to their proximate and
immediate principle. (Heb. iv, 12.) For it is in reference to his life, that
God the Father produces out of his own essence his Word and his Spirit; and in
reference to his life, God understands, wills, is able to do, and does, all
those things which He understands, wills, is able to do, and actually does.
Hence, since blessedness consists in action, it is with propriety ascribed to
life. (1 Tim. i, 11; Rom. vi, 23.) This also seems to be the cause why it was
the will of God, that his oath should be expressed in these words, "THE
LORD LIVETH." (Jer. iv, 2.)
XXVIII. The life of God is his essence
itself, and his very being; because the Divine Essence is in every respect
simple, as well as infinite, and therefore, eternal and immutable. On this
account, to it, and indeed to it alone, is attributed immortality, which,
therefore, cannot be communicated to any creature. (1 Tim. i, 17; vi, 16.) It
is immense, without increase and decrease; it is one and undivided, holy and set
apart from all things; it is good, and therefore communicable, and actually
communicative of itself, both by creation and preservation, and by habitation
commenced in this life, to be consummated in the life to come. (Gen. ii, 7;
Acts xvii, 28; Rom. viii, 10, 11; 1 Cor. xv, 28.)
XXIX. But the life of God is active in
three faculties, in the understanding, the will, and the power or capability
properly so called. In the Understanding, inwardly considering its object of
what kind soever, whether it be one with it or united to it in the act
of understanding. In the Will, inwardly willing its first, chief, and proper
object; and extrinsically willing the rest. In the Power, or capability
operating only extrinsically, which may be the cause of its being called by the
particular name of capability, as being that which is capable of operating on
all its objects, before it actually operates.
On the understanding
of God
XXX. The understanding of God is a
faculty of his life, which is the first in nature as well as in order, and by
which He distinctly understands all things and every thing which now have, will
have, have had, can have, or might hypothetically have, any kind of being; by
which He likewise distinctly understands the order which all and each of them hold
among themselves, the connections and the various relations which they have or
can have; not excluding even that entity which belongs to reason, and which
exists, or can exist, only in the mind, imagination, and enunciation. (Rom. xi,
33.)
XXXI. God, therefore, understands
himself. He knows all things possible, whether they be in the capability of God
or of the creature; in active or passive capability; in the capability of
operation, imagination, or enunciation. He knows all things that could have an
existence, on laying down any hypothesis. He knows other things than himself,
those which are necessary and contingent, good and bad, universal and
particular, future, present and past, excellent and vile. He knows things
substantial and accidental of every kind; the actions and passions, the modes
and circumstances of all things; external words and deeds, internal thoughts,
deliberations, counsels, and determinations, and the entities of reason,
whether complex or simple. All these things, being jointly attributed to the
understanding of God, seem to conduce to the conclusion, that God may
deservedly be said to know things infinite. (Acts xv, 18; Heb. iv, 13; Matt.
xi, 27; Psalm cxlvii, 4; Isa. li, 32, 33; liv, 7; Matt. x, 30; Psalm cxxxv, 1
John iii, 20; 1 Sam. xvi, 7; 1 Kings viii, 39; Psalm xciv, 11; Isa. xl, 28;
Psalm cxlvii, 5; 139; xciv, 9, 10; x, 13, 14.)
XXXII. All the things which God knows,
he knows neither by intelligible images, nor by similitude, (for it is not
necessary for Him to use abstraction and application for the purpose of
understanding;) but He knows them by his own essence, and by this alone, with
the exception of evil things which he knows indirectly by the opposite good
things; as, through means of the habitude, privation is discovered. Therefore,
(1.) God knows himself entirely and
adequately. For He is all being, light and eye. He also knows other things
entirely; but excellently, as they are in Himself and in his understanding;
adequately, as they are in their proper natures. (1 Cor. ii, 11; Psalm xciv, 9,
10.)
(2.) He knows himself primarily; and it
is impossible for that which God understands first and by itself, to be any
other thing than his own essence.
(3.) The act of understanding in God is
his own being and essence.
XXXIII. The mode by which God
understands, is not that which is successive, and which is either through
composition and division, or through deductive argumentation; but it is simple,
and through infinite intuition. (Heb. iv, 13.) THEREFORE,
(1.) God knows all things from eternity;
nothing recently. For this new perfection would add something to His essence by
which He understands all things; or his understanding would exceed His essence,
if he now understood what he did not formerly understand. But this cannot
happen, since he understands all things through his essence. (Acts xv, 18;
Ephes. i, 4.)
(2.) He knows all things immeasurably,
without the augmentation and decrease of the things known and of the knowledge
itself. (Psalm cxlvii, 5.)
(3.) He knows all things immutably, his
knowledge not being varied to the infinite changes of the things known. (James
i,
17)
(4.) By a single and undivided act, not
being diverted towards many things but collected into himself, He knows all
things. Yet he does not know them confusedly, or only universally and in
general; but also in a distinct and most special manner He knows himself in
himself, things in their causes, in themselves, in his own essence, in
themselves as being present, in their causes antecedently, and in himself most
pre-eminently. (Heb. iv, 13; 1 Kings viii, 39; Psalm cxxxix, 16, 17.)
(5.) And therefore when sleep,
drowsiness and oblivion are attributed to God, by these expressions is meant
only a deferring of the punishment to be inflicted on his enemies, and a delay
in affording solace and aid to his friends. (Psalm xiii, 1, 2.)
XXXIV. Although by one, and that a
simple act, God understands all things, yet a certain order in the objects of
his knowledge may be assigned to Him without impropriety, indeed, it ought to
be for the sake of ourselves. (1.) He knows himself. (2.) He knows all things
possible, which may be referred to three general classes. (i.) Let the first be
of those things to which the capability of God can immediately extend itself,
or which may exist by his mere and sole act. (ii.) Let the second consist of
those things which, by God’s preservation, motion, aid, concurrence and
permission, may have an existence from the creatures, whether these creatures
will themselves exist or not, and whether they might be placed in this or in
that order, or in infinite orders of things; let it even consist of those
things which might have an existence from the creatures, if this or that
hypothesis were admitted. (1 Sam. xxiii, 11, 12; Matt. xi, 21.) (iii.) Let the
third class be of those things which God can do from the acts of the creatures,
in accordance either with himself or with his acts. (3.) He knows all beings,
whether they be considered as future, as past, or as present; (Jer. xviii, 6;
Isa. xliv, 7;) and of these there is also a threefold order. The first order is
of those beings which by his own mere act shall exist, do exist, or have
existed. (Acts xv, 18.) The second is of those which will exist, do exist, or
have existed, by the intervention of the Creatures, either by themselves, or
through them by God’s preservation, motion, aid, concurrence and permission.
(Psalm cxxxix, 4) The third order consists of those which God will himself do
or make, does make, or hath made, from the acts of the creatures, in accordance
either with himself or with his acts. (Deut. 28). This consideration is of
infinite utility in various heads of theological doctrine.
XXXV. God understands all things in a
holy manner, regarding things as they are, without any admixture. (Psalm ix, 8;
1 Thess. ii, 4.) On this account He is said to judge, not according to the
person or appearance and the face, but according to truth. (Rom. ii, 2.)
XXXVI. The understanding of God is
certain, and never can be deceived, so that He certainly and infallibly sees
even future contingencies, whether He sees them in their causes or in
themselves. (1 Sam. xxiii, 11, 12; Matt. xi, 21.) But, this certainty rests
upon the infinity of the essence of God, by which in a manner the most present
He understands all things.
XXXVII. The understanding of God is
derived from no external cause, not even from an object; though if there should
not afterwards be an object, there would not likewise be the understanding of
God about it. (Isa. xl, 13, 14; Rom. xi, 33, 34.)
XXXVIII. Though the understanding of God
be certain and infallible, yet it does not impose any necessity on things, nay,
it rather establishes in them a contingency. For since it is an understanding
not only of the thing itself, but likewise of its mode, it must know the thing
and its mode such as they both are; and therefore if the mode of the thing be
contingent, it will know it to be contingent; which cannot be done, if this
mode of the thing be changed into a necessary one, even solely by reason of the
Divine understanding. (Acts xxvii, 22-25, 31; xxiii, 11, in connection with
verses 17, 18, &c., with xxv, 10, 12; and with xxvi, 32; Rom. xi, 33; Psalm
cxlvii, 5.)
XXXIX. Since God distinctly understands
such a variety of things by one infinite intuition, Omniscience or All-Wisdom
is by a most deserved right attributed to Him. Yet this omniscience is not to
be considered in God according to the mode of the habitude, but according to
that of a most pure act.
XL. But the single and most simple
knowledge of God may be distinguished by some modes, according to various
objects and the relations to those objects, into theoretical and practical
knowledge, into that of vision and of simple intelligence.
XLI. Theoretical knowledge is that by
which things are understood under the relation of being and of truth. Practical
knowledge is that by which things are considered under the relation of good,
and as objects of the will and of the power of God. (Isa. xlviii, 8; xxxvii,
28, xvi, 5.)
XLII. The knowledge of vision is that by
which God knows himself and all other beings, which are, will be, or have been.
The knowledge of simple intelligence is that by which He knows things possible.
Some persons call the former "definite" or "determinate," and
the latter "indefinite" or "indeterminate" knowledge.
XLIII. The schoolmen say besides, that
one kind of God’s knowledge is natural and necessary, another free, and a third
kind middle. (1.) Natural or necessary knowledge is that by which God
understands himself and all things possible. (2.) Free knowledge is that by
which he knows, all other beings. (3.) Middle knowledge is that by which he
knows that "if This thing happens, That will take place." The first
precedes every free act of the Divine will; the second follows the free act of
God’s will; and the last precedes indeed the free act of the Divine will, but
hypothetically from this act it sees that some particular thing will occur.
But, in strictness of speech, every kind of God’s knowledge is necessary. For
the free understanding of God does not arise from this circumstance, that a
free act of His will exhibits or offers an object to the understanding; but
when any object whatsoever is laid down, the Divine understanding knows it
necessarily on account of the infinity of its own essence. In like manner, any
object whatsoever being laid down hypothetically, God understands necessarily
what will arise from that object.
XLIV. Free knowledge is also called
"foreknowledge," as is likewise that of vision by which other beings
are known; and since it follows a free act of the will, it is not the cause of
things; it is, therefore, affirmed with truth concerning it, that things do not
exist because God knows them as about to come into existence, but that He knows
future things because they are future.
XLV. That kind of God’s knowledge which
is called "practical," "of simple intelligence," and
"natural or necessary," is the cause of all things through the mode
of prescribing and directing, to which is added the action of the will and
power; (Psalm civ, 24;) although that "middle" kind of knowledge must
intervene in things which depend on the liberty of a created will.
XLVI. God’s knowledge is so peculiarly
his own, as to be impossible to be communicated to any thing created, not even
to the soul of Christ; though we gladly confess, that Christ knows all those
things which are required for the discharge of his office and for his perfect
blessedness. (1 Kings viii, 39; Matt. xxiv, 36.)
On the will of God
XLVII. By the expression "will of
God" is signified properly "the faculty itself of willing," but
figuratively sometimes "the act of willing," and at other times
"the object willed." (John vi, 39; Psalm cxv, 3.)
XLVIII. Not only a consideration of the
essence and of the understanding of God, but also the Scriptures and the
universal agreement of mankind, testify that a will is correctly attributed to
God.
XLIX. This is the second faculty in the
life of God, § 29, which follows the Divine understanding and is
produced from it, and by which God is borne towards a known good. Towards a
good, because it is an adequate object of his will. And towards a known good,
because the Divine understanding is previously borne towards it as a being, not
only by knowing it as it is a being, but likewise by judging it to be good.
Hence the act of the understanding is to offer it as a good, to the will which
is of the same nature as the understanding, or rather, which is its own
offspring, that it may also discharge its office and act concerning this known
good. But God does not will the evil which is called that of
"culpability"; because He does not more will any good connected with
this evil than He wills the good to which the malignity of sin is opposed, and
which is the Divine good itself. All the precepts of God demonstrate this in
the most convincing manner. (Psalm v, 4, 5.)
L. But Good is of two kinds — the Chief
Good itself, and that which is different from it. (Matt. xix, 17; Gen. i, 31.)
The order which subsists between them is this: the latter does not exist with
the Chief Good, but has its existence from it by the Understanding and the Will
of God. (Rom. xi, 36.) Wherefore the Supreme Good is the primary, the choicest,
and the direct object of the Divine Will; that is, its own infinite Essence,
which was alone from all eternity, infinite ages prior to the existence of
another good; and therefore it is the only good. (Prov. viii, 22-24.) On this
account it may also be denominated, without impropriety, the peculiar and
adequate object of the Divine Will. Since the Understanding and the Will of God
were, each by its own act, borne towards this Essence they found such a
plenitude of Being and Goodness in it, that the Understanding gave its judgment
for commencing the communication of it outwards: and the Will approved of this
kind of communication, after that method; whence the existence of a good, of
what kind soever it was, which was different from the Chief Good. It cannot,
therefore, be called an object of the Divine Will, except an indirect one,
which God wills on account of that Chief Good, or rather He wills it to be on
account of the Chief Good. (Prov. xvi, 4, .) Therefore, The Will of God is the
very Essence of God, yet distinguished from it according to the formal reason.
LI. The act by which the Will of God
advances towards its objects, is (1.) most simple: for as the Understanding of
God by a most simple act understands its own Essence, and, through it, all
other things; so the Will of God, by a single and simple act, wills its own
goodness, and all things in its goodness. (Prov. xvi, 4.) Therefore, the
multitude of things willed is not repugnant to the simplicity of the Divine
Will. (Isa. xliii, 7; Ephes. i, 5-9.) (2.) This act is Infinite: for it is
moved to will, neither by an external cause, by any other efficient, nor by an
end, which is out of itself; it is not moved even by any object which is not
itself. (Deut. vii, 7; Matt. xi, 26.) Nay, the willing of the end is not the
cause of willing those things which are for the end; though it wills those
things which are for the end to be put in order to that end. (Acts xvii, 25,
26; Psalm xvi, 9.) It is no valid objection to this truth, that God would not
will or do some things unless some act of the creature intervened. (1 Sam. ii,
30.) (3.) It is Eternal; because nothing can de novo either be or appear good
to God. (4.) It is Immutable; because that which has once either been or seemed
good to Him, both is and appears such to Him perpetually; and that by which God
is known to will any thing, is nothing else but this, his immutable entity.
(Mal. iii, 6; Rom. xi, 1.) (5.) This act is likewise Holy: because God advances
towards his object only on account of its being good, not on account of any
other thing which is added to it; and only because his Understanding accounts
it good, not because feeling inclines him towards it without right
reason. (2 Tim. ii, 19; Rom. ix, 11; 12, 4; Psalm cxix, 137.)
LII. As the simple and external act by
which the Divine Understanding knows all its objects, has not excluded order
from them; so likewise may we be allowed to assign a certain order, according
to which the simple and sole act of the will of God is borne towards its
objects: (1.) God wills his own Essence and Goodness, that is, himself. (2.) He
wills all those things which, by the extreme judgment of his wisdom, He hath
determined to be made out of infinite beings possible to himself. (Prov. xvi,
4.) And, First, He wills to make them. Then, when they are made, He is affected
towards them by his Will, as they have some similitude to his nature. (Gen. i,
31; John xiv, 23.) (3.) The third object of the Divine Will are those things
which God judges it to be right that they should be done by creatures endowed
with understanding and free-will: and his act of willing concerning these
things is signified by a precept, in which we likewise include the prohibition
of that which He wills not to be done by the same creature. (Exod. xx, 1, 2,
&c.; Micah vi, 8.) We allow it to remain a matter of discussion, whether
counsels can have a place here, provided those things about which the
consultations are held be not considered as things of supererogation.
(4.) The fourth object of the Divine Will is the Divine permission, by which
God permits a rational creature to do what He forbade, and to omit what he
commanded; and which consists of the suspension of an efficacious impediment,
not of one that is due and sufficient. (Acts xiv, 16, 17; Psalm lxxxi, 13; Isa.
v, 4) (5.) The fifth object of the Divine Will are those things which,
according to his own infinite wisdom, God judges to be done from the acts of
rational creatures. (Isa. v, 5; 1 Sam. ii, 30; Gen. xxii, 16, 17.)
LIII. But though nothing from without be
the cause of God’s volition, yet, since he wills that there should be order in
things, (which order is placed principally in this, that some things be the
causes of others,) just so far as God’s volition is borne towards those
objects, it is as if it were the cause of itself as it is borne towards others:
(Hosea ii, 21, 22.) Thus the cause why He wills the condemnation of any one,
this, because he wills the order of his justice to be observed throughout the
universe. (John vi, 40; Deut. vii, 8.) Neither do we therefore deny, but that
an act of a creature, or the omission of an act, may be thus far the occasion
or primary cause of a certain Divine volition, that, without any consideration
of that act or its omission, God might set it aside by such a volition. (1 Sam.
ii, 30; Jer. xviii, 7, 8.)
LIV. Through his own Will, and by means
of his Power, God is the cause of all other things; (Lam. iii, 37, 38;) yet so
that when he acts through second causes, either with them or in them, he does
not take away their own peculiar mode of acting with which they have been
divinely endued but he suffers them according to their own mode to produce
their own effects, necessary things necessarily, contingent things
contingently, free things freely: and this contingency and freedom of second
causes does not prevent that from being certainly done, or coming to pass,
which God in this manner works by them; and therefore, the certain futurition
of an event does not include its necessity. (Isa. x, 5, 6, 7; Gen. xlv, 5, 28;
Acts xxvii, 29, 31.)
LV. Though God by a single and undivided
act wills all the things which he wills; yet his Will, or rather his Volition,
may be distinguished from the objects, by a consideration of the mode and order
according to which it is borne towards its objects.
LVI. The Divine Will is borne towards
its object, either according to the mode of Nature, or according to the mode of
Liberty. According to the mode of Nature, it tends towards a primary and proper
object, one that is suitable and adequate to its nature. According to the mode
of Liberty, it tends towards all other things. Thus, God by a natural necessity
wills himself; but He wills freely all other things; (2 Tim. ii, 13; Rev. iv,
11;) though the act which is posterior in order may be bound by a free act
which is prior in order. This may be called "hypothetical necessity,"
having its origin partly from the free volition and act of God, partly from the
immutability of his nature. "For God is not unrighteous," says the
Apostle, "to forget the work and labour of love" of the pious;
because he hath promised them a remuneration, and the immutability of his
nature does not suffer him to rescind his promises. (Heb. vi, 10, 18.)
LVII. To this must be subjoined another
distinction, according to which God wills something as an end, and other things
as the means to that end. His Will tends towards the end by a natural affection
or desire; and towards the means by a free choice. (Prov. xvi, 4)
LVIII. The will of God is also
distinguished into that by which he wills to do or to prevent something, and
which is called "the will of his good pleasure," or rather "of
his pleasure"; (Psalm cxv, 3;) and into that by which he wills something
to be done, or to be omitted, by creatures endued with understanding, and which
is called "the will which is signified." The latter is revealed; the
former is partly revealed, and partly hidden. (Mark iii, 35; 1 Thess. iv, 3;
Deut. xxix, 29; 1 Cor. ii, 11, 12.) The
former is efficacious, for it uses power, either so much as cannot be resisted,
or such a kind as He certainly knows nothing will withstand: (Psalm xxxiii, 9;
Rom. ix, 19.) The latter is called "inefficacious," and resistance is
frequently made to it; yet so that, when the creature transgresses the order of
this revealed Will, the creature by it may be reduced to order, and that the
Will of God may be done on those by whom his Will has not been performed. (2
Sam. xvii, 14; Isa. v, 4, 5; Matt. xxi, 39-41; Acts v, 4; 1 Cor. vii, 28.) To
this two- fold Will is opposed the Remission of the Will, which is called "Permission,"
and which is also two-fold. The one, which permits something to the power of a
rational creature, by not circumscribing its act with a law; and this is
opposed to "the revealed Will." The other is that by which God
permits something to the capability and will of the creature, by not
interposing an efficacious hindrance; and this is opposed to "the Will of
God’s pleasure" that is efficacious. (Acts xiv, 16; Psalm lxxxi, 13.)
LIX. The things which God wills to do he
wills (1.) either from himself, not on account of any cause placed out of
himself, whether this be without the consideration of any act which proceeds
from the creature, or solely on occasion of the act of the creature: (Deut.
vii, 7, 8; Rom. xi, 35; John iii, 16.) Or (2.) He does it on account of some
other previous cause laid down on the part of the creature. (Exod. xxxii, 32,
33; 1 Sam. xv, 17, 23.) In regard to this distinction, some work is said to be
proper to God, and some foreign to Him and his "strange work." (Lam.
iii, 33; Isa. xxviii, 21.) This is also signified by the church in the
following words: "O God! whose property is, ever to have mercy and to
forgive," &c.
LX. Some persons also distinguish the
will of God into that which is antecedent, and that which is consequent. This
distinction has reference to one and the same volition or act of the rational
creature, which if the act of the Divine will precedes, it is called the
"antecedent will of God"; (1 Tim. ii, 4;) but if it follows, it is
called his "consequent will": (Acts i, 25; Matt. xxiii, 37, 38.) But
the antecedent will, it appears, ought to be called velleity, rather than will.
LXI. There is not much distance between
this distinction, and another, according to which God is said to will some
things "so far as they are good when absolutely considered according to
their nature"; but to will other things "so far as, after an
inspection, of all the circumstances, they are understood to be
desirable."
LXII. God also wills some things in
their antecedent causes; that is He wills their causes as relatively, and
places those causes in such order, that effects may follow from them; and, if
they do follow, that they may of themselves be pleasing to him. (Ezek. xxxiii,
11; Gen. iv, 7.) He wills other things not only in their causes, but also in
themselves. (John vi, 40; Matt. xi, 25, 26.) incident with this, is the
distinction of the Divine Will into Conditional and Absolute.
LXIII. Lastly. God wills some things per
se or accidentally. He wills per se, those things which are simply and
relatively good; (2 Pet. iii, 9; accidentally, those which are in some respect
evil, but which have such good things united with them as He wills in
preference to the respective good things which are opposed to those evil ones:
thus, He wills the evils of punishment, because he would rather have the order
of justice preserved in punishment, than suffer an offending creature to go
unpunished. (Jer. ix, 9 Psalm i, 21; Jer. xv, 6.)
Let the following be
problems to us
(1.) Is it possible for two
affirmatively contrary volitions of God to tend towards one and the same
uniform object?
(2.) Is it possible for one volition of
God to tend towards contrary objects?
lxiv. In this momentum of the Divine
Nature, come under consideration those attributes which are ascribed to him in
the Scriptures, either properly or figuratively, according to a certain analogy
of affections and moral virtues in us; such as are love, hatred, goodness,
mercy, desire, anger, justice, &c.
LXV. Those things which have the analogy
of affections may be commodiously referred to two principal kinds. So the first
can embrace those which we may call primary or principal; the second, those
which are derived from the primary.
LXVI. 1The first or principal are Love,
(whose opposition is Hatred,) and Goodness; and with these are connected Grace,
Benignity and Mercy.
LXVII. Love is an affection of union in
God, the objects of which are God himself and the good of justice or
righteousness, the creature and its felicity. (Prov. xvi, 4; Psalm. xi, 7; John
iii, 16; Wisdom xi, 24-26.) HATRED is an affection of separation in God, the
object of which are the unrighteousness and misery of the creature. (Psalm v,
5; Ezek. xxv, 11; Deut. xxv, 15, 16, &c.; Isa. i, 24) But since God
primarily loves himself and the good of justice, and at the same moment hates
iniquity; and since He loves the creature and its happiness only secondarily,
and at the same moment dislikes the misery of the creature; (Psalm xi, 5; Deut.
xxviii, 63;) hence it comes to pass, that he hates a creature that
pertinaciously perseveres in unrighteousness, and He loves its misery. (Isa.
lxvi, 4.)
LXVIII. Goodness in God is an affection
of communicating his own good. (Rev. iv, 11; Gen. i, 31.) Its first object
outwards is nothing; and thus necessarily the first, that, on its removal,
there can be no outward communication. The First advance of this goodness is
towards the creature as it is a creature; the Second is towards the creature as
it performs its duty, to communicate good to it beyond the remuneration
promised. Both these procedures of the Divine goodness may appropriately
receive the appellation of "Benignity." The Third advance is towards
a creature that has sinned, and that has by such transgression rendered itself
liable to misery. This advance is called Mercy, that is, an affection for
affording succour to a person in misery, sin itself presenting no obstacle to
its exercise. (Rom. v, 8; Ezek. xvi, 6.) We attribute these advances to the Divine
Goodness in such a manner, that in the mean time we concede to the love of God
towards his creatures its portion in these advances.
LXIX. Grace seems to stand as a proper
adjunct to Goodness, and to Love towards the creatures. According to it, God is
disposed to communicate his own good, and to love the creatures, not of merit
or of debt, nor that it may add anything to God himself; (Psalm xvi, 2;) but
that it may be well with him on whom the good is bestowed, and who is beloved.
(Exod. xxxiv, 6; Rom. v, 8; 1 John iv, 7.)
LXX. The affections which arise from the
primary ones, § 65, are special, as being those which are not occupied
about Good and Evil in common, but specially about Good as it is present or
absent. We distinguish these affections according to the confined capacity of
our consideration, as they have some analogy either in Concupiscibility or in
Irascibility.
LXXI. In the Concupiscible we consider,
first, Desire and that which is opposed to it; and, afterwards, Joy and Grief.
We describe Desire, in God, as an affection for obtaining the works of
righteousness which have been prescribed to creatures endued with
understanding, and for bestowing on them "the recompense of reward":
(Psalm lxxxi, 13-16; v, 3-5; Isa. xlviii, 18, 19.) To this is opposed that
affection according to which God abhors the works of unrighteousness, and the
omission of a remuneration. (Jer. v, 7, 9.) Joy is an affection arising from
the presence of a thing that is suitable: such as the fruition of himself, the
obedience of the creature, the communication of his own goodness, and the
destruction of his rebels and enemies. (Isa. lxii, 5; Psalm lxxxi, 13; Prov. i,
24-26.) Grief, which is its opposite, has its origin in the disobedience and
the misery of the creature, and in the occasion given by his people for
blaspheming the name of God among the Gentiles. Nearly allied to this is
Repentance, which, in God, is nothing more than a change of the thing willed or
done, on account of the act of a rational creature. (Gen. xv, 6; Jer. xviii,
8-10.)
LXXII. In the Irascible we place Hope,
and its opposite, Despair, Confidence and Anger, and we do not exclude even
Fear, which, by an Anthropo-pathy, we read, as attributed to God. (Deut. xxxii,
27.) Hope is an attentive expectation of a good work due from the creature, and
by the grace of God capable of being performed. It may easily be reconciled
with the certain fore-knowledge of God. (Isa. v, 4; Luke xiii, 6, 7.) Despair
arises from the pertinacious wickedness of the creature, who is "alienated
from the life of God," and hardened in evil, and who, after "he is
past feeling," his conscience having been "seared with a hot
iron," has "given himself over unto lasciviousness, to work all
uncleanness with greediness." (Jer. xiii, 23; Ephes. iv, 18, 19.) What in
God we call Confidence or Courage, is that by which He with great animation
prosecutes a good that is beloved and desired, and puts away and repulses an
evil that is hated. Anger is an affection of depulsion in God, through the punishment
of the creature who has transgressed his law; by which He brings upon the
creature the evil of misery for his unrighteousness, and takes the vengeance
which is due to Himself, as an indication of his love of righteousness and his
hatred of sin. When this is vehement, it is called "Fury." (Isa.
lxiii, 3-5; Ezek. xiii, 13, 14; Isa. xxvii, 4; Jer. ix, 9; Deut. xxxii, 35;
Jer. x, 24; 12, 13; Isa. lxiii, 6.)
LXXIII. We attribute these affections to
God, on account of some of his own which are analogous to them, without any
passion, as He is simple and immutable; and without any inordinateness,
disorder and repugnance to right reason; for He exercises himself in a holy
manner about all things which are the objects of his will. But we subject the
use and exercise of them to the infinite wisdom of God, whose office it is
previously to affix to each its object, mode, end, and circumstances, and to
determine to which of them, in preference to the rest, is to be conceded the
province of acting. (Exod. xxxii, 10-14; Deut. xxxii, 26, 27.)
LXXIV. Those things in God which have an
analogy to moral virtues, as moderators of these affections, are partly general
to all the affections, as Righteousness; and partly concern some of them in a
special manner, as Patience, and those which are moderators of Anger and of the
punishments which proceed from Anger.
LXXV. Righteousness or Justice in God,
is an eternal and constant will to render to every one his own: (Psalm xi, 7)
To God himself that which is his, and to the creature what belongs to it. We
consider this righteousness in its Words and in its Acts. In all its Words are
found veracity and constancy; and in its Promises, fidelity. (2 Tim. ii, 13;
Num. xxiii, 19; Rom. iii, 4; 1 Thess. v, 24) With regard to its Acts, it is
two-fold, Disposing and Remunerative. The former is that according to which God
disposes all the things in his actions through his own wisdom, according to the
rule of equity which has either been prescribed or pointed out by his wisdom.
The latter, remunerative righteousness, is that by which God renders to
his creatures that which belongs to it, according to his work through an
agreement into which He has entered with it. (Heb. vi, 10, 17, 18; Psalm cxlv,
17; 2 Thess. i, 6; Rev. ii, 23.)
LXXVI. Patience is that by which God
patiently endures the absence of a good that is loved, desired, and hoped for,
and the presence of an evil that is hated; and which spares sinners, not only
that He may through them execute the judicial acts of his mercy and justice,
but that he may likewise lead them to repentance; or may punish with the
greater equity and more grievously, the contumacious. (Isa. v, 4; Ezek. xviii,
23; Matt. xxi, 33- 41; Luke xiii, 6-9; Rom. ii, 4, 5; 2 Pet. iii, 9.)
LXXVII. Long-suffering, gentleness,
readiness to pardon, and clemency, are the moderators of Anger and Punishments.
Long- Suffering suspends anger, lest it should hasten to drive away the evil as
soon as ever such an act was required by the demerits of the creature. (Exod.
xxxiv, 6; Isa. xlviii, 8, 9; Psalm ciii, 9.) We call that Gentleness, or
Lenity, which attempers Anger, lest it should be of too great a magnitude; nay,
lest its severity should correspond with the magnitude of the wickedness
committed. (Psalm ciii, 10.) We call that Readiness To Pardon, which moderates
Anger, so that it may not continue forever, agreeably to the deserts of
sinners. (Psalm xxx, 5; Jer. iii, 5; Joel ii, 13.) Clemency is that by which
God attempers the deserved punishments, that by their severity and continuance
they may be far inferior to the demerits of sin, and may not exceed the
strength of the creature. (2 Sam. vii, 14; Psalm ciii, 13, 14.)
On the power of God
LXXVIII. By the term "The Power Of
God," is meant not a passive power, which cannot happen to God who is a
pure act; nor the act, by which God is always acting in himself through
necessity of nature; but it signifies an active power, by which He can operate
extrinsically, and by which he does so operate when it seems good to himself.
LXXIX. We describe it thus: "It is
a faculty of the Life of God, posterior in order to the Understanding and the
Will, by which God can, from the liberty of his own Will, operate extrinsically
all things whatsoever that He can freely will, and by which he does whatsoever
He freely wills." Hence it appears, that Power resembles a principle which
executes what the will commands under the direction of knowledge. But we wish
Impeding or Obstruction to be comprehended under the operation. (Psalm cxv, 3; Lament.
iii, 37, 38; Psalm xxxiii, 9; Jer. xviii, 6.) Therefore,
From this we exclude the power or
capability of generating and breathing forth, because it acts in a natural
manner and intrinsically.
LXXX. The measure of the Divine
Capability is the Free Will of God, and indeed this is an adequate measure.
(Psalm cxv, 3; Matt. xi, 25-27) For whatsoever God can will freely, He can
likewise do it; and whatsoever it is possible for Him to do, He can freely will
it; and whatever it is impossible for Him to will, He cannot do it; and that
which He cannot do, He also cannot will. But He does, because He wills; and He
does not do, because He does not will. Therefore, He does the things which He
does, because He wills so to do. He does them not, because He wills them not;
not, on the contrary. Hence the objects of the Divine Capability may be most
commodiously, and indeed ought to be, circumscribed through the object of the
Free Will of God.
LXXXI. The following is the manner:
Since the Free Will of God rests upon a Will conducting itself according
to the mode of his nature, and both of them have an Understanding which
precedes them, and which, in conjunction with the Will, has the very Essence of
God for its foundation; and since God can freely will those things alone which
are not contrary to his Essence and Natural Will, and which can be comprehended
in his Understanding as entities and true things: it follows, that He can do
these things alone; nay, that He can likewise do all things, since the Free
Will of God, and therefore, his Power also, are bound by those alone. And since
things of this kind are the only things which are simply and absolutely
possible, all other things being impossible, God is deservedly said to be
capable of doing all things that are possible. (Luke i, 37; xviii, 27; Mark
xiv, 36.) For how can there be an entity, a truth, or a good, which is contrary
to His Essence and Natural Will, and incomprehensible to his Understanding?
LXXXII. The things thus laid down as
described in the last clause of the preceding Thesis are indeed confessed
by all men; and they are generally described in the schools as things
impossible, which imply a contradiction. But it is asked in species, "What
are those things?" We will here recount some of them. God cannot make
another God; is incapable of being changed; (James i, 17;) he cannot sin;
(Psalm v, 5;) cannot lie; (Num. xxiii, 19; 2 Tim. ii, 13;) cannot cause a thing
at the same time to be and not to be, to have been and not to have been, to be
hereafter and not hereafter to be, to be this and not to be this, to be this
and its contrary. He cannot cause an accident to be without its subject, a
substance to be changed into a pre-existing substance, bread into the body of
Christ, and He cannot cause a body to be in every place. When we make such
assertions as these, we do not inflict an injury on the power of God; but we
must beware that things unworthy of Him be not attributed to his Essence, his
Understanding, and his Will.
LXXXIII. The Power of God is infinite;
because it can do not only all things possible; (which are innumerable, so that
they cannot be reckoned to be such a number, without a possibility of their
being still more;) but likewise because nothing can resist it. For all created
things depend upon the Divine Power, as upon their efficient principle, as the.
phrase is, both in their being and in their preservation; whence Omnipotence is
deservedly attributed to Him. (Rev. i, 8; Ephes. iii, 20; Matt. iii, 9; xxvi,
53; Rom. ix, 19; Phil. iii, 21.)
LXXXIV. Since the measure of God’s Power
is his own Free Will, and since therefore God does anything because he wills to
do it; it cannot be concluded from the Omnipotence of God that anything will
come to pass, or will afterwards be, unless it be evident from the
Divine Will. (Dan. iii, 17, 18; Rom. iv, 20, 21; Matt. viii, 2.) But if this be
evident from the will of God, what He hath willed to do is certain to be done,
although, to the mind of the creature, it may not seem possible. (Luke i, 19,
20, 34-37.) And that the mind must be "brought into captivity to the
obedience of faith," is a truth which here finds abundant scope for
exercise.
LXXXV. The distinction of Power into
absolute, and ordinary or actual, has not reference to God’s Power so much as
to his Will, which uses his Power to do some things when it wills to use it,
and which does not use it when it does not will; though it would be possible
for it to use the Power if it would; and if it did use it, the Divine Will
would, through it, do far more things than it does. (Matt. iii, 9.)
LXXXVI. The Omnipotence of God cannot be
communicated to any creature. (1 Tim. vi, 15; Jude. 4.)
On the perfection of
God
LXXXVII. From the simple and infinite
combination of all these things, when they are considered with the mode of pre-
eminence, the Perfection of God has its existence. Not that by which He has
every single thing in a manner the most perfect; for this is effected by
Simplicity and Infinity: but it is that by which, in the most perfect manner,
he has all things which denote any perfection. And it may fitly be described
thus: "It is the interminable, the entire, and, at the same time, the
perfect possession of Essence and Life." (Matt. v, 48; Gen. xvii, 1; Exod.
vi, 3; Psalm l:10; Acts xvii, 25; James i, 17.)
LXXXVIII. This Perfection of God
infinitely exceeds the perfection of all the creatures, on a three-fold
account. For it possesses all things in a mode the most perfect, and does not
derive them from another. But the perfection which the creatures possess, they
derive from God, and it is faintly shadowed forth after its archetype. Some
creatures have a larger portion of this derived perfection than others;
and the more of it they possess, the nearer they are to God and have the
greater likeness to Him. (Rom. xi, 35, 36; 1 Cor. iv, 7; Acts xvii, 28, 29; 2
Cor. iii, 18; 2 Pet. i, 4; Matt. v, 48.)
LXXXIX. From this Perfection, by means
of some internal act of God, his Blessedness has its existence; and his Glory
exists, by means of some relation of it extrinsically. (1 Tim. i, 11; vi, 15;
Exod. xxxiii, 18.)
On the blessedness of
God
XC. Blessedness is through an act of the
understanding: is it not also through an act of the will? Such is our opinion;
and we delineate it thus. It is an act of the life of God, by which he enjoys
his own perfection, that is fully known by his Understanding and supremely
loved by his Will; and by which He complacently reposes in this Perfection with
satisfaction. (Gen. xvii, 1; Psalm xvi, 11; 1 Cor. ii, 9, 10.)
XCI. The Blessedness of God is so
peculiar to himself, that it cannot be communicated to a creature. (1 Cor. xv,
28.) Yet, in relation to the object, he is the beautifying good of all
creatures endued with understanding, and is the Effector of the act which tends
to this object, and which reposes with satisfaction in it. In these consists
the blessedness of the creature.
The Glory of God
XCII. The Glory of God is from his
Perfection, regarded extrinsically, and may in some degree be described thus:
It is the excellence of God above all things. God makes this glory manifest by
external acts in various ways. (Rom. i, 23; ix, 4; Psalm viii, 1.)
XCIII. But the modes of manifestation,
which are declared to us in the scriptures, are chiefly two: the one, by an
effulgence of light and of unusual splendour, or by its opposite, a dense
darkness or obscurity. (Matt. xvii, 2-5; Luke ii, 9; Exod. xvi, 10; 1 Kings
viii, 11.) The other, by the production of works which agree with his
Perfection and Excellence. (Psalm xix, 1; John ii, 11.)
But ceasing from any more prolix
discussion of this subject, let us with ardent prayers suppliantly beseech the
God of Glory, that, since He has formed us for his Glory, He would vouchsafe to
make us yet more and more the instruments of illustrating his Glory among men,
through Jesus Christ our Lord, the brightness of his Glory, and the express
image of his Person.
